



# **RADICAL PERIPHERY** STATUS OF POST-SOVIET NON- RECOGNIZED STATES (1989-2017)

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# MAIN THESES

- a network of six post-Soviet non-recognized states with population over 4 mln people and history of around quarter of century of existence on the edge of Europe constitute *Radical Periphery* of Big Europe
- The term '*Radical Periphery*' means that political, economic, social, legal and economic processes in these polities go on not just like in any other peripheral society, but also against the will and interests of the (Western) core
- the usual interdependency of core and different semi-cores and peripheries here is more striking and leads to the need to add to Wallerstein's three statuses of the core-peripheries' scale the fourth one, *Radical Periphery*
- EU should have wise engagement policy for 4 mln Europeans living in NRC

# METHODOLOGY

- **Global Core – Periphery**: Frank 1967; Amin 1976; Wallerstein 1974, 2004; Arrighi et al. 1989 : differentiation of core and peripheries in the capitalist world-system based on difference in profitability of production, role in unequal exchange and political influence on global, regional and national scale
- Types of states in core – periphery networks:
  - **Core**: strong in numerous states winning from the unequal exchange
  - **Semi-core/semi-periphery**: ascending or descending states under pressure from core and the need to not to end up in periphery
  - **Periphery**: unstable states dependent on the core
  - Additional:
    - **External areas**: states outside world-system
    - **Counter-systemic movements**: used culture and identities for destruction of old and creation of new states

# METHODOLOGY

- **National Core – Periphery**: Rokkan 1967, 1970; Anderson 1983; Said 1978
  - Identified core-periphery in terms of **cultural symbolic dominance**, followed by administrative control and economic exploitation (or unequal exchange) between capital and provinces
  - Correlation of cultural, economic and political dominance
- Common approach: measuring core – peripheries in terms of **dominance, resistance, competition, cooperation** and **adaptation**

	<b>economic</b>	<b>political</b>	<b>cultural</b>
<b>core states</b>	quasi-monopolies, benefit from unequal exchange, suppression of competition, high level of value added, minimal poverty	non-questioned political influence, decisive impact on international legislation and political order	producers of cultural product, definers of identities' hierarchies, centers of education and scholarship, strong impact on legitimacy definitions
<b>semi-core/semi-peripheral states</b>	quasi-monopolies competing with core, bigger role of competing economy, lower level of value added, considerable poverty	questioned political influence, sporadic impact on international legislation and political order, political competition with core in certain regions	mixed production and consumption of own and core's cultural product, subjects of biggest pressure from core-defined identities' hierarchies, sporadic influence in global education and scholarship, weak impact on global legitimacy definitions
<b>peripheral states</b>	production with minimal value added, imposed competition, wide-spread poverty	minimal political influence outside country, strong impact of core and semi-core inside country, adapting to regional order	consumers of core's cultural product and identities' hierarchies, consumers of education and scholarship products of the core and semi-core, sporadic impact on legitimacy definitions

# METHODOLOGY

- **Non-recognized states/de facto states/para-states** (Tilly 1992; Kolsto 2006; Pelczynska-Nalecz, Strachota & Falkowski 2008; Stanislawski 2008)
  - **As-if states**, that is, internationally recognized states but cannot perform the basic functions of state
  - **Almost-states**, that is, para-state organisms that gained de facto independence but are not recognized internationally
  - **Black spots**, that is, areas that do not aspire to independence, while yet remaining beyond the control of any state
  - NRC features:
    - **Control territory** and communities without internal competitors
    - Did not achieved international **recognition**
    - Persist in this state of non-recognition for more than **two years**



	defence of territory from external threat	full control over inside populations	provision of state's exclusive services	collection of resources necessary for state's functionality	recognized by other subjects of international relations
as-if state	no	no	no	no	yes
almost-state / para-state	yes	yes	yes	yes	no
black spots	partially	partially	partially	partially	no

# POST-SOVIET NRC

	population	territory (km2)	period of existence	metropolitan state	sponsor state	recognition
<b>Abkhasia-Apsny</b>	240,750	8,660	app. 25 y.	Georgia	Russia	Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Nauru
<b>DNR</b>	2,299,120	na	app. 3 y.	Ukraine	Russia	no
<b>LNR</b>	1,475,841		app. 3 y.	Ukraine	Russia	no
<b>Nagorno-Karabakh Artsakh</b>	150,932	11,500	app. 25 y.	Azerbaijan	Armenia	no
<b>South Ossetia</b>	53,532	3,900	app. 25 y.	Georgia	Russia	Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Nauru
<b>Transnistria</b>	475,665	4,163	app. 25 y.	Moldova	Russia	no



# HISTORY OF NRC

- **Stage 1:** 1991-94: collapse of Soviet Union: **15 recognized states** (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan) and **4 NRC** (Abkhazia, Nagorny Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Transnistria)
- **Stage 2:** Russian internal reconciliation: 1994-2008, struggle for federal unity from Tatarstan to Chechnia
- **Stage 3:** new wave of NRC building, 2008-now;
  - Russian-Georgian war of 2008 led to partial recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia)
  - Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014
  - on-going Donbas war with involvement of Russia-backed separatists, establishment of two non-recognized states in Eastern Donbas, the so-called Donetsk People's Republic and Lugansk People's Republic (DNR, LNR)
- A **network of six post-Soviet NRC** with population over 4 mln people and history of around quarter of century of existence on the edge of Europe

	economy	politics	culture	c-p role
<b>Abkhazia-Apsny</b>	depends on Russia, non-self-sufficient economy	depends on Russia with growing local volatility, established state structure	emerging identities, conflict among pro-Russian and independentist identities	included in the world-system as non-competing economy and competing political and cultural units through Russia as semi-core opposing EU/West, radical periphery with no perspective of integration to Ukraine or Russia, or of independence
<b>DNR</b>	depends on Russia, non-self-sufficient economy	depends on Russia with growing local volatility, emerging state structure	emerging identities, conflict among pro-Russian, independentist, pro-Soviet and pro-Ukrainian identities	included in the world-system as non-competing economy and competing political and cultural units through Russia as semi-core opposing EU/West, radical periphery with no perspective of integration to Ukraine or Russia, or of independence
<b>LNR</b>	depends on Russia, non-self-sufficient economy	depends on Russia with growing local volatility, emerging state structure	emerging identities, conflict among pro-Russian, independentist, pro-Soviet and pro-Ukrainian identities	included in the world-system as non-competing economy and competing political and cultural units through Russia as semi-core opposing EU/West, radical periphery with no perspective of integration to Ukraine or Russia, or of independence
<b>Nagorno-Karabakh Artsakh</b>	depends on Armenia, weak non-self-sufficient economy	depends on Armenia, established state institutions	strong ethnic identity, controls political discourse and power in Yerevan	included in the world-system as non-competing economy and competing political and cultural units through Armenia as periphery obedient to EU/West and Russia, radical periphery with no perspective of integration with Armenia, or of independence
<b>South Ossetia</b>	depends on Russia, non-self-sufficient economy	depends on Russia with growing local volatility, established state structure	strong ethnic identity, some conflict between ethnic and pro-Russian identities	included in the world-system as non-competing economy and competing political and cultural units through Russia as semi-core opposing EU/West, radical periphery with no perspective of integration to Russia or Georgia, or of independence
<b>Transnistria</b>	depends on trade with Moldova and Ukraine and financial support of Russia, non-self-sufficient economy	depends on Russia with growing local volatility, strong state structure	strong non-ethnic civic identity, some conflict among pro-Russian, independentist, and pro-Moldovan identities	included in the world-system as non-competing economy and competing political and cultural unit through Russia as semi-core opposing EU/West, radical periphery with no perspective of integration to Moldova or Russia, or of independence

# PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

- Unlike the usual periphery, post-Soviet NRC are not participating in the unequal economic exchange – absence of economic interest
- 4 out of 6 NRC are established states and nations with partial recognition and sponsorship from Russia and Armenia – quest for full international recognition and normal periphery status
- 2 NRC are emerging states and nations, with sponsorship from Russia
- Identities and cultural issues lead politics and subdue economy
- EU/West is seen as core and as existential enemy of all 6 NRC

# POST-SOVIET NRC AND EU

- 1991-2003: EU as conflict manager on the side of metropolitan states
- 2003-09: European Neighborhood Policy implementation and learning from mistakes, still endorsement of metropolitan states
- 2009: Eastern Partnership initiative as more nuanced policy tool (not only governments, attention to some NRC)
  - 2009: adoption of EU Non-Recognition and Engagement Policy with Abkhazia and South Ossetia
    - Differentiates from UN, OSCE ets
    - Political and Security Committee of the Council of EU defined **non-paper policy** to engage with Abkhazia and South Ossetia , “a political and legal space in which EU can interact with the separatist regions without compromising its adherence to Georgia’s territorial integrity”
- No changing impact, DNR and LNR as failures of EU involvement

# POST-SOVIET NRC AND EU

- Old NRC approach:
  - Anti-westernism mixed with the need for recognition and normalization
  - Usual periphery status as the wished one
  - Participation in shadow economy and politics undermining interests of EU
- New NRC approach:
  - Militarized anti-Westernism; Europe as existential enemy
  - Usual periphery status as the wished one
  - Participation in shadow economy and politics undermining interests of EU
- Old and new NRC: contacts with EU-member states secessionist movements
- Russia's interest in use of NRC as proxies in fighting for its semi-core/core status vis-à-vis Western core and post-Soviet peripheries

# FINAL CONCLUSIONS

- NRC must be addressed by EU and West
- Engagement in economic terms may lessen radicalism of NRC and support for Russia's conflicting position
- Human rights and cultural interests of communities living in NRC should be respected
- Political non-recognition remains a common policy for EU and metropolitan states



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